I. Introduction
Conflict affects education in several ways. It destroys infrastructure (Abdi, 1998) , displaces and most tragically results in the deaths of students and teachers (Buckland, 2005) , causes problems in harmonizing school calendars across conflict-affected regions (UNICEF, 2005) while schools remain closed for an indefinite period of time (Bruck, 1997) , and has a damaging and pernicious socio-psychological impact on students (Sany, 2010) . A cross-country analysis by Lai and Thyne (2007) shows that countries experiencing civil conflict suffer a decline in school enrolment by 1.6 to 3.2 percentage points. Evidence is growing at the subnational level that the outcomes are similar. Merrouche (2006) documents that an exposure to landmines in Cambodia resulted in an average loss of 0.4 years of education. In a similar study, the mid-1990s genocide in Rwanda lowered the average level of educational attainment by 0.5 years (Akresh and de Walque, 2008) .
From the perspective of gender, Shemyakina (2006) finds that conflict makes no significant impact on male education rates in Tajikistan. However, females were 12.3 percentage points less likely to complete the mandatory secondary schooling compared to those who completed their education before the conflict broke out. A recent study, using household survey data between 2000 and 2008 from twenty-five conflict affected countries, finds that conflict leaves a legacy of fewer average years of education, decreased literacy rates and a smaller share of the population with formal schooling (UNESCO, 2010) .
In this paper we estimate the effect of conflict on education in Côte d'Ivoire. In particular, we measure the effect of Ivoirian conflict, which reached its peak between 2002 and 2004, on years of schooling for individuals who were exposed to it in their school-going age. We combine the year of birth and the department of birth to determine an individual's exposure to conflict. The civil conflict in Côte d'Ivoire broke out in September 2002 as a result of growing ethnic tensions and a failed attempted military coup. It divided the country into two: the rebelheld North and the government-controlled South and caused more than 3,000 deaths (World Bank, 2010) . The conflict internally displaced more than 700,000 people and as many as 500,000 children were out of school between 2002 and 2004 (UNICEF, 2004 . According to the Ministry of Education of Côte d 'Ivoire (2004) , education in the North was affected more severely than education in the South. As per this report, almost 50 percent of the school-going aged children were out of school and only 20 percent of government-paid teachers stayed in their posts in the North since 2002. Moreover, the start of the 2005 school year was delayed in the North, and approximately 72,000 children were unable to write their examinations in the North (UNICEF, 2005) .
A recent study by UNESCO (2010 ) uses 2006 to conduct a quantitative study on the relationship between education and conflict in Côte d'
Ivoire. This study finds an increase in the uneducated proportion of male cohorts in conflictaffected areas. Looking separately at the educational attainments for males and females, it concludes that for both genders the average educational attainment has dropped since the conflict broke out. To our knowledge this is the only quantitative study so far that examined the impact of conflict on education in Côte d'Ivoire. However, this study does not draw any causal inference on the potential impact of conflict on education. In addition, the MICS survey was undertaken in 2006 just after conflict had reached its peak, and as a result it might not have demonstrated the full impact of conflict.
Our study aims to bridge this knowledge gap. We calculate the effect of civil conflict on years of schooling in Côte d'Ivoire using the Households Living Standards Survey (HLSS) data collected in 2008 and the data on local incidences of conflict taken from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Database (ACLED). Our baseline empirical strategy to identify the indirect effect of conflict on years of schooling for the school-going age-cohort combines year and department of birth to determine an individual's exposure to conflict. Thus the identification strategy relies on the fact that older cohorts who escaped conflict during their school-going age have no correlation with the variation in conflict intensity across departments. We find statistically significant support to this assumption, which strengthens our identification strategy.
We also use a set of victimization indicators to measure the direct effect of conflict. The difference-in-difference regression outcomes indicate that the average years of education for individuals aged 10 to 22 is 0.94 years fewer compared to the individuals aged 23 to 32 in conflict-affected regions. This implies that the average Ivorian born between 1986 and 1998 would have spent 1.2 more years in school even if all the tensions and all the inequality in access and all the government policies had been the same, but somehow or other physical violence had remained suppressed in certain departments where the events of violence were significantly higher. Our identification of exogenous shock due to conflict is measured combining both years and regions of birth, not just the year of birth.
As a robustness check, we use the same set of victimization indicators to measure the potential effect of conflict and estimate a counterfactual comparison group based on propensity scores matching. This, we expect, is likely to minimize the selection bias and confounding in the estimated effect of conflict. The estimated effect of conflict identified by all the victimization categories indicates 0.2 to 0.9 fewer average years of education for conflict victims compared to the matched control group. The outcomes of double-robust models satisfactorily show less chances of misspecification in the estimated models. The outcomes are robust when we use a number of sensitivity analyses including alternative matching methods, and estimating the North and the South subsamples separately. In addition, we estimate the direct effect of conflict exposure across gender and age-specific groups. The outcomes are robust and show the largest impact on boys and individuals in the age group 19 to 22.
The paper is structured as follows. In section II, we provide a brief outline of the nexus between education, politics and conflict in Côte d'Ivoire. Section III describes the data and provides some descriptive evidence. We discuss the empirical models, identification strategies and the empirical findings in section 4. This is followed by the outcomes of sensitivity analysis in section 5. We provide our concluding remarks at the end.
II. The Political Economy of Conflict and Education
To evaluate the impact of conflict on education in Côte d'Ivoire, it is important to understand the Ivoirian education system and how it was linked to the consequences of armed conflict. First we provide a brief account of the conflict and education nexus in Côte d'Ivoire for the period until the conflict broke out. We then discuss it for the period 2002 to 2006, during and after the conflict peak.
The period until 2002
Since its independence in 1960, the education system has been central to Ivoirian identity and politics. Côte d'Ivoire follows the centralized French education system, where the government plays a key role in curriculum development, coordination and allocation of resources and the organization of national examinations through the ministries of Education, Vocational Education and Higher Education. Prior to the civil conflict the education system was already struggling with a student-teacher ratio close to 40 (UNAIDS, 1998) While economic disparity between the North and the South and polarization of ethnicity and identity based on national origin were arguably the main causes of Ivoirian civil conflict, unequal access to education and uneven allocation of educational infrastructures between the North and the South also played a crucial role (Sany, 2010) . Despite the improvement in country-wide net enrollment rates in the early 2000s, the enrollment rate in the Northern regions of Korhogo and Odiene were below 40 percent. Overall, there was a marked disparity in enrollment rates between the North (less than or equal to 50 percent) and the South (close to 80 percent).
The period from 2002 to 2004
The first phase of armed conflict started in September, 2002 but lasted for only a few months.
The national army (FANCI) was joined by the Young Patriots, a youth militia that supported then President Gbagbo. On the other side, the rebel groups -the Movement for Justice and Peace In addition, during the conflict both sides actively sought to include university students on their side. The higher education institutes filled with active students' organizations and teachers' associations became the center stage of political movements. Many prominent political leaders including the former President Laurent Gbagbo and former Prime Minister Guillaume Soro emerged from the students' movements, reinforcing the Ivoirian sentiment that the education system has produced political leaders rather than business leaders (Sany, 2010) . analysis. Some researchers prefer to follow the grid-cell approach because the unit of analysis does not change spatially (Buhaug and Rod, 2006) . In comparison, when the unit of analysis is the sub-national regions, they are likely to vary in terms of area. In this study we map the exact locations of the conflict event provided by the ACLED database into 50 departments using spatial coordinates taken from the DIVA-GIS ii website.
III. Data and Descriptive Evidence
[ Figure 3 .2 is about here] In Table 3 .1 we provide descriptive evidence of basic indicators on conflict affected individuals. The first two columns compare the average outcomes for a young cohort (10 to 22 years old) between the low conflict and the high conflict departments, the last two columns show the same for an older cohort (22 to 32 years old). We define high conflict as departments experiencing at least one conflict event in the period 2002-2006, if there is no evidence of reported event of conflict we call it a low conflict area. As is evident from table 3.1, the average years of education are lower for the young cohort, though the education attainment gap is insignificant between high and low conflict areas. Other educational variables do not show any significantly different outcomes for conflict affected individuals. We use log of per capita household consumption expenditure as an indicator of household welfare. We consider ten expenditure categories including food, education, health, transport, clothing, and transport among others to construct this indicator. The gap in the average welfare level is negligible between the high and the low conflict areas. While average years of education is higher for the old cohort, a higher percentage of households are female headed in the conflict affected areas.
Among the ethnic groups, the Akans are more likely to be found in high conflict areas whereas members of the Voltaic group are more concentrated in the low conflict areas. Overall, these preliminary summary statistics are suggestive of a lower educational attainment for children in the conflict affected regions, in the next section we use both the direct and indirect exposure to conflict to evaluate its effect on educational.
IV. Empirical Outcomes

Indirect exposure to conflict: Identification using department and year of birth
According to the ENV-2008 survey data, for more than 90 percent of the individuals who earned the CEPE (completed six years of primary education), it took between 6 to 10 years. This suggests the majority of the students in the primary school are in the 6 to 16 age group with the plausible assumption that primary education normally starts at the age of six. To identify the potential victims of conflict, we construct a young cohort including all primary school goers who [ school attainment compared to the old cohort. In departments where violence broke out, the gap in average years of schooling between the old and young cohorts stands at 2.71 years whereas in departments which are not direct victims of violence the same gap stands at 1.52 years. In other words, the gap in average years of education between older and younger cohort is twice as big in the conflict zones compared to the departments with no conflict event. However, for both agecohorts, the average years of schooling in conflict-affected departments is higher compared to the rest. Two possible explanations can be offered. First, the conflict zones (departments that experienced conflict) traditionally had higher average years of education and this could be due to better educational facilities or better job prospects. Second, due to the pernicious effect of conflict throughout the country, the gap in average years of education between conflict and nonconflict zones became smaller for the young age-cohort. Overall, the difference-in-difference outcome suggests that an individual aged between 10 and 22 experienced an average drop of 1.2 years of schooling if s/he resided in a conflict affected department.
To check for the evidence of common support we consider two older cohorts, aged between 33 to 42 years in 2008, we call them old_1. Our difference-in-difference strategy is unaffected by common support problem if we find similar trends of education attainment between the older cohorts who escaped the conflict in their school-going age. Apparently, the statistical evidence provides no threat to the difference-in-difference identification strategy as we find insignificant differences in years of schooling between old and old_1 in both no-conflict and conflict departments. In addition, the identification strategy relies on the fact that older cohorts who escaped conflict during their school-going age have no correlation with the variation in conflict intensity across departments. We find statistically significant support to this assumption, which strengthens our identification strategy 1 .
We generalize this identification strategy with a regression framework, shown as equation 1 (Duflo, 2001; Merrouche, 2011; Shemyakina, 2011) . This estimates the average years of education as a function of birth fixed effects and household / individual specific controls. If exposure to conflict (i.e. residing in the departments that had at least one conflict event) is detrimental to years of schooling, then the estimated coefficient of average years of education will be negatively correlated with the intensity of conflict for the young age-cohort which is exposed to conflict.
(1) where measures years of education for an individual i born in department j in year k. is a constant, is a dummy variable indicating department of birth fixed effect, is a dummy variable that measures cohort of birth fixed effect, is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual belongs to the young cohort, is a variable measuring intensity of conflict and is a vector of household specific controls. to 32 in departments that had at least one conflict event. The coefficient drops to -0.5 when we include household level control variables (as shown in column 2). If there is significant variation in the conflict count across departments, the dummy conflict indicator may not adequately explain the variation in average years of education across departments. As a robustness check, the next two columns report the estimated coefficients of years of education when the conflict intensity variable is measured as the actual number of conflict events. The outcome suggests that an increase in the conflict intensity by one additional event of conflict lowers the average years of education for the young age-cohort (aged 10 to 22 years) by 0.01 years compared to old agecohort (aged 23 to 32).
[ Finally, we do a robustness check to find to what extent the omitted variable bias problems undermine our estimated coefficients. As evident from Table 4 .2.1, after controlling for observable factors at the household level, the magnitude of the effect of conflict on years of schooling is halved. This motivated us to examine the household fixed effects further. As evident from descriptive statistics shown in Table 3 .1, the presence of the ethnic group Akan is significantly higher in high conflict departments while, for the Voltaic ethnic group, it shows exactly the opposite picture. These are controlled for in our regression using fixed effects, which is likely to explain the drop in coefficients to some extent. However, differences across households in unobserved characteristics, such as conflict-led displacement, depletion in the supply of academic staff for the same reason and child soldiering (Blattman and Annan, 2010) , could also undermine the estimated coefficients further. We use a statistic developed by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) using selection on observables to estimate the potential bias from unobservables. We use their suggested ratio R= , which in our case, indicates how much stronger the selection on unobservables, relative to selection on observables, needs to be to explain away the estimated effect of conflict on educational attainment. For estimates in Table 4 .1.2, the average value of R is around two. This implies that, on average, the selection on unobservables has to be at least twice as strong compared to the selection on observables to explain away the estimated regression coefficients. This conceivably means that our model outcomes are unlikely to be affected by the omitted variable bias.
Direct exposure to conflict: Identification using victimization indicators
The estimated coefficients of the effect of conflict on education show an expected sign. However, We first estimate the standard linear OLS regression outcomes of years of education as a function of the victimization dummy and household and individual controls on a sample restricted to individuals aged between 10 and 22 (who are likely to have been in primary school during the conflict). In Table 4 .2.1 we report the estimated coefficients for the eleven victimization categories (columns M1 through M11). The coefficients of all the victimization dummy variables are negative. The coefficients are statistically significant for victimized individuals or households when they registered deaths or injuries due to conflict , income dropped, lost job, lost livestock and experienced violence due to conflict. Overall, the estimated conflict outcomes on education are in line with previous findings, despite the fact that the impact of conflict is now identified by a set of victimization indicators based on the subjective evaluation of conflict impact by the survey respondents.
[ Table 4 .2.1 is about here]
V. Sensitivity analysis
Propensity score matching outcomes
The identification strategies used so far assume that the conflict victims (as identified above) and control groups are exchangeable, such that they have identical distributions of variables. This can be confirmed by data using a randomized controlled trial. However, drawing causal inference using survey data requires a more careful analysis because selection biases and confounding invalidates the exchangeability assumption. In such cases the estimated effects are likely to be biased. Since a direct comparison of two groups of individuals may not overcome the problem of identification, we go one step further and employ propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) . This means pairing individuals who are identical based on all observable characteristics (including department of birth, other households characteristics and the relevant socio-economic factors) that the rich ENV-2008 survey data offers, except variables that measure conflict victimization. We discuss it more formally in the online appendix.
There exists a range of possibilities for matching algorithms. But, the performance of different matching estimators depends largely on the data structure (Zhao, 2000) . For our purpose, we use the straightforward nearest neighbor matching as a baseline strategy. This method first categorized both the treatment and the control group records according to the estimated propensity score and then searches backward and forward for the closest control units for a particular treatment value. Overall, most of our empirical models do not encounter any common support problem (discussed in detail in the online appendix). Table 5 .1 summarizes the estimated effect of conflict on educational outcomes for each of the 11 models. The propensity score matching method yields a negative impact of conflict on years of education in the sample restricted to individuals aged between 10 and 22. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) indicates that irrespective of the type of conflict victimization, conflict victims in comparison with the matched control group indicate a lower average years of education. The mean difference is statistically significant particularly when the conflict victims reported being affected by the conflict, registered deaths due to the conflict, their income dropped, and they lost jobs.
[ Table 5 .1 is about here]
As a further robustness check we use the concept of double-robust estimators (Robins, 2000; Bang and Robins, 2005) . The double-robust estimation method requires a model for estimating the propensity scores and the outcome model (OLS in our case) in the same estimator (discussed in detail in the online appendix). Overall, the findings show mixed outcomes, and there exists a trade-off in the estimation model choice between the OLS and propensity scores matching. We also employ additional matching criteria such as the nearest neighbor matching without replacement, the caliper matching, and the kernel matching. The findings (shown in the online appendix) reveal that the estimated effect of conflict on education is negative throughout and this outcome is independent of any matching criterion.
Alternative measures of educational outcomes
In the previous analysis we used only total years of education as an educational outcome variable.
As a sensitivity analysis, we propose to look at another potential outcome variable that measures the percentage of population that completed CEPE (six years of primary education). This is justified by the fact that the average years of education based on the ENV-2008 data is recorded as being little over 7 years and almost 40 percent of the population fail to complete the CEPE.
Thus, percent completed CEPE can be a good indicator of the status of education in Côte d'
Ivoire. We estimate nonparametric kernel-weighted local polynomial regressions of percent ever completing six years of primary education against age using Epanechnikov kernel. We ran the regressions separately for the conflict victims and the rest of the sample as identified by the victimization indicators. The internally displaced individuals do not show a different trend in the successful completion of CEPE. However, for households that suffered loss of ownership, we find a drop in the rate of successful completion of six years of primary education.
Effect of direct exposure to conflict on sub-samples: The North versus the South
We compare empirical outcomes from sub-samples: the North and the South. We designate the departments using the United Nations peace-keeping line (also known as the fault line). Out of a total of 50 departments, the North has 16 and the rest of the departments are classified as being in the South. We find that for both the old and the young cohort, the average years of education is lower in the North (The tables are shown in online appendix III). The difference-in-difference outcome implies individuals in the young-age cohort have on average 0.72 more years of education compared to the old cohort in the North. This is somewhat in contradiction with the anecdotal evidence that the North was hit harder due to conflict. To obtain a generalized picture, we run OLS regression outcomes. The impact of conflict on the average years of education by regions (the North and the South) is identified by the victimization indicators with the same set of control variables. Overall, the findings do not suggest any clear evidence in support of the North being the worst conflict-affected region in terms of education outcomes. 
Effect of direct exposure to conflict on sub-samples: Gender and age-specific groups
VI. Conclusion
The We use a number of tests to check the validity of the estimated outcomes. We used propensity scores matching to minimize the selection bias and confounding in the estimated effect. The average effect of conflict as identified by the victimization categories reports a 0.2 to 0.9 fewer average years of education for the conflict victims in comparison to the matched control group. The moderately satisfactory outcomes of double-robust models lower chances of misspecification in the estimated models. The outcomes are also robust when we use alternative matching methods, using different educational outcome variables and estimating the North and the South subsamples separately. We also looked at subsamples by gender and different agegroups. For individuals in the age group 19-22, the estimated outcomes show the largest impact of conflict on years of education; males on average have less years of education compared to females when directly exposed to conflict.
Understanding the mechanism though which conflict affects education is critical in order to disentangle the pernicious effects of conflict on education. The education and conflict nexus in Côte d'Ivoire provides a complex picture and in this paper we attempted to explore the channels through which conflict could possibly affect education. Nevertheless, some caveats apply. The role of third parties, such as NGOs in promoting primary and secondary education in the North is difficult to incorporate in the estimated effect. It is also possible that the existence of internally displaced populations and the timing of the survey could downplay the estimated measured effect of conflict. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence derived from our study on Côte d'Ivoire provides robust support to the existing studies on how conflict has a detrimental impact on education. The household level controls include log per capita consumption expenditure, gender, gender of household head, average years of education in the household, ethnic groups (Akan, Krou, Mande North, Mande South, Voltaic (comparison group) and religious groups (Muslims and Christians); *** implies significant at 1%, ** implies significant at 5% and * implies significant at 10%. Estimation with robust standard errors. Notes: The household level controls include log per capita consumption expenditure, gender, gender of household head, average years of education in the household, ethnic groups (Akan, Krou, Mande North, Mande South, Voltaic (comparison group) and religious groups (Muslims and Christians); *** implies significant at 1%, ** implies significant at 5% and * implies significant at 10%. Estimation with robust standard errors. (ATT: the average treatment effect on the treated) 
Online Appendix
I. Propensity Score Matching
Let us denote the binary victimization indicator equals to one if individual i is a war victim and zero otherwise. We are particularly interested in estimating the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). This can be written as below:
where ( ) denotes the potential education outcome (years of education in our case) for each individual i. As the average education level of the counterfactual comparison group -
-is not observed, we generate propensity scores to choose a proper substitute from the matched pairs based on propensity scores. Propensity scores are generated by simple probit regression. Individuals are paired chosen from the war victims (treatment group) and the rest (control group) based on the similar propensity scores and then we calculate the average difference in years of schooling across them.
The common support between the treatment and the control group Figure A1 provides a visual description of the comparison of propensity score distributions between the direct civil war victims (treated) and the matched comparison groups (untreated).
The visual analysis of the density distribution of propensity scores is the most straight forward way to check the overlap and the region of common support between the treatment and comparison group (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005) . To determine the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), it is sufficient to ensure the existence of potential matches in the control group (Bryson, Dorsett and Purdon, 2002) . In our case, except M5, M6, M7 and M8, the rest of the models show a satisfactory match just by visual observations. Overall, most of our empirical models do not encounter any common support problem. We discuss this in further detail in the next section. 
Combining matching and regression: double-robust estimation
Any method that uses propensity score matching requires that the model is specified correctly with all relevant confounders included in the model (Emsley et al, 2008) . In reality it is hard to ascertain that the empirical models we estimate are correctly specified. However, as a robustness check one can use the concept of double-robust estimators (Robins, 2000; Bang and Robins, 2005) . The double-robust estimation method requires a model for estimating the propensity scores and the outcome model (OLS in our case) in the same estimator. Ideally, this method selects only those observations which are on common support and discards the rest of the data. In the context of the present study, by using this method we prune from the data all the observations that are not similar to the propensity scores of war victims, and then run a simple linear OLS regression on the observations that are left in the data set.
Additionally this retains the weights from matching, thus indicating how many times each control case will be used in the regression. The double-robust estimators provide unbiased estimates of the treatment effect when either or both of these models are correctly specified.
In a sense, it provides more protection against the misspecification (Uysal, 2011). *** implies significant at 1%, ** implies significant at 5% and * implies significant at 10%.
In Table A .1, we compare the estimates of the linear OLS model, propensity score matching and double-robust model for 11 victimization categories, M1 to M11. We use this table as a sensitivity analysis to assess the specification of the OLS and propensity score matching models. If these models are correctly specified then ideally the double-robust estimates would produce a similar effect. As is shown in Table 5 .1.1, M2, M3 and M4 are correctly specified in the propensity score matching. However, M5 and M6 are correctly specified when estimated in the OLS model. We conclude this as they closely match with the double-robust estimated coefficient of the causal effect of war on years of education. The outcomes from the rest of the models do not conform to the double-robust estimates closely.
Overall, the support is mixed, and there exists a trade-off in the estimation model choice between the OLS and propensity scores matching.
Implementing alternative matching criteria
So far, we used the nearest neighborhood with replacement as a baseline matching criterion.
A number of alternative matching criteria do exist and it is argued that in large samples all of these propensity score matching estimators should yield the same results asymptotically (Smith, 2000) . However, choosing an appropriate matching criterion becomes a concern when we are left with small samples (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997) . In our study models such as M6, M7, M8 and M9 have a relatively smaller sample size. As a robustness check we estimate the causal effect of war on education using three additional matching criteria for each of the models. Since performance of different matching criteria depends largely on the data structure and varies case-by-case (Zhao, 2000) , we compare the average treatment effect on the treated (victims) from different matching estimators side by side (Table A. 2). we use a non-parametric matching estimator, the kernel matching, which uses weighted averages of all entries in the control group to construct the counterfactual outcome.
According to Smith and Todd (2005) , kernel matching can be seen as a weighted regression of the counterfactual outcome on an intercept with weights given by the kernel weights. The outcome is similar to the baseline model; however, in most of the models, the estimated effect of war on education is significant using the kernel method. This could possibly be because kernel matching includes observations that are bad matches. Overall, we find robust support for the baseline findings. 
III. Estimating impact of war on sub-samples: The North versus the South
As the final robustness check, we compare empirical outcomes from sub-samples: the North and the South. Table A .3 reports the simple difference-in-difference outcome of average years of education on age-cohorts between the North and the South sub-populations. Out of a total of 50 departments the North has 16 which were located to the north of the United Nations peace-keeping line (also known as the fault line). The rest of the departments are classified as being in the South. As is evident from Table A .3, for both the old and the young cohort, the average years of education is lower in the North. However, the difference is twice as big as for the old cohort (aged between 23 and 32 years) compared to the younger one (aged between 10 and 22 years). As a result the difference-in-difference outcome for years of education is .72 years. This implies individuals in the young-age cohort have on average .72 more years of education compared to the old cohort in the North. It might suggest that despite the historically lower educational outcome in the North, the impact of war on education fell most heavily on the school going age-cohort that was exposed to the war. To obtain a generalized picture, we run OLS regression outcomes for the impact of war on the average years of education by region as identified by the victimization indicators. Table 5 .4.2 compares the outcomes between the full sample, i.e. the North and the South sample. For the displaced household members and households that registered death due to war, the effect of war is negative and significant only in the North. However, when we compare educational outcomes of households where members lost their jobs or reported declines in income, we find that war had a similar negative effect. Overall, the similarities and dissimilarities in these findings might have a lot to do with the subjective bias in responses and selection bias into victimization between the North and the South subpopulations. Nevertheless, we do not find any clear evidence in support of the North being the worst war-affected region in terms of education outcomes. The household level controls include log per capita consumption expenditure, gender, gender of household head, average years of education in the household, ethnic groups and religious groups; *** implies significant at 1%, ** implies significant at 5% and * implies significant at 10%.
